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JURISDICTION:
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiciton over this matter based on Rule 60(b) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, UCA, and Rule 3 , Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

ISSUES PRESENTED & STANDARD OF REVIEW:
The major issue presented is, DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR in denying the
Appellant/Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Utah Code
of Civil Procedure, even though it held that a tort could not be a debt, and that without
being a debt it could not have been assigned to the Appellee/Plaintiff as a cause of action in
the first place, but that such an action was upheld due to the passage of time, without
consideration of the Appellant/Defendant's legal unsophistication and loss of counsel. The
author of the Defendant/Appellant's dilema is a combination of his inability to understand
how to protect his rights in court and the unwillingness of the court to protect those rights
independant of participation of counsel.

Liability based on debt requires a contractual obligation. The Appellant had no
contract with the Appellee nor its assignor, no check was written, no judgment prior to
assignment. As Judge McGuire so stated in his ruling (see Exhibit "Aff):
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"The issue, simply stated is whether or not the term 'or other indebtedness' found in
U.C.A. 12-1-8 includes 'debts' occured by a claim of negligence on the part of the defendant.
A 'debt1 suit based on tort, and not contract."
Further he so states:
"It is in the court's opinion that the term or other indebtedness do not contemplate
assigned actions based on tort. The [sic] flies into the face of the whole concept of
collection agencies and the concept of assignment."
Judge McGuire then reversed direction and excused the plaintiff \appellee by stating
that the matter is no longer in controversy inasmuch as the opportunity to make objections has
passed. Appellant disagrees and now submits to this court that it was not defective to dismiss
the case inasmuch as it was begun without standing and without privity and was only won
due to the unrepresented defendant's inability to protect himself in court and the court's
reluctance to rule and intervene on the obvious and the court must bear some of the burden.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:
In the trial court, the Judge, after hearing the matter, upheld the earlier decision by
the court and refused to allow the setting aside of the judgment. The law, which was
presented to the Judge, did not come to light until after the hearing. The Plaintiff /Appellee
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was able during the trial to introduce the testimony of persons who had not themselves gone
to the actual job site and were in fact speaking completely on hearsay. Without alerting the
defendant as to the nature of the hearsay being offered in open court or as to the effect it
would have, the court effectively negated its objectivity as it at the same time excluded the
hearsay documents of the defendant which were his only defense thus insuring that
proceduraly he would lose, in spite of the fact the case brought by the plaintiff was void on
its face. What is on trial should not be the abilities of an unrepresented defendant, as are
most defendants in collection cases, but whether or not the court will intervene when serious
violations occured which are plain and simple to observe for the legal practitioner and but for
the lack of expertise of the defendant would not have been otherwise permitted.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS:
1. On or about October 16, 1989, the Appellant, a plumber by trade who works for
M-4 Plumbing and Heating, Inc. of Springville, responded to a call from homesowners,
Dane and May Beth Robertson of 1690 No. Meadow Lark Dr., Orem, regarding a problem
they were having with their plumbing. They indicated that the problem they were having was
in the front of their yard and responded to the appellant's inquiry as to whether they had
called "blue stake" to confirm the location of underground utility lines. They indicated that
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they had and there would be no problem in escavating as they had been told that all of the
utility lines were in the back of the house.
2.

It was not unusal under the circumstances to not see any warning markings.

The

appellant before digging again repeated his request concerning blue stake to which he was
again told that there was no problem that the service had been contacted. The occupants
affirmed that they had actually called the week before and that there was no danger.
3. During the process of removing the dirt covering the water line the appellant heard
a click but observed no damage. There was no power outage nor was it confirmed that what
was struck was in fact a power line. Six hours after he completed his work there was in fact
a power outage in the area. Utah power and light assigned to the Appellee the right to collect
in this action.
4. The Appellee, not Utah Power and Light, brought a debt action against the
Appellant based on that assignment. Appellant's counsel asked for an additional $500.00
prior to trial to finish the case.
5. When appellant could not produce the fees his counsel refused to finish his
representation. As a result Appellant was forced to defend himself at trial. At trial Appellant
did not object to the use of witnesses by the Appellee who had never been to or inspected the
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site nor had any personal knowledge that the actions of the Appellant were in fact the direct
cause of the power outage. He did know that he could.
6. When the appellant attempted to introduce sworn statements by the homeowners
such statements were barred as hearsay upon the objection of the Appellee's counsel. The
court found in favor of the appellee and did not address the issue that there was in fact no
cause of action based on debt, that this was in fact a tort case and could not be assigned.
7. After the judgment was entered no additional papers were served on the appellant
due to the fact that he and his family had moved to another location in Springville due to
financial reasons. However, the appellant continued to openly work for M-4 Plumbing. Due
to lack of notice nothing else was done on the case until the appellee summoned the appellant
to court on a supplemental hearing to discover his assets for collection purposes. At this point
appellant contacted present counsel and requested he review the case.
8.

Soon thereafter counsel accompanied the appellant to the supplemental hearing

and told the court that a Rule 60(b) motion would be made to set aside the judgment.
Counsel for appellee objected but was informed by the court that it was right of the appellant
to bring such a motion.
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ARGUMENT:
POINT I:
WHETHER OR NOT IT IS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION
TO SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT

1.

A denial of a motion to vacate under 60(b) is ordinarily reversed only for an

abuse of discretion. State Department of Social Services v. Vijil 784 p. 2d 1132 (Utah 1989).
The district court judge is vested with condsiderable discretion under Rule 60(b) in granting
or denying a motion to set aside judgment. Katz v. Pierce 732 P2d 92, 93 (Utah 1986),
Russell v. MartelL 681 P2d 1193, 1194 (Utah 1984) and Baker v. Western SilL Co.. 757 p.2d
878, 881 (UtahCt App. 1988).
2.

The court should generally be indulgent toward setting aside a judgment where

there is reasonable justification or excuse for the defendant's failure to answer and when
timely application is made. State ex rel. Utah State Dept. of Social Services v. Musselman ,
67 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1983), Airken International. Inc. v. Parker. 30 Utah 2d 65, 513 P.2d 429
(1973). Where there is doubt about whether a judgment should be set aside that doubt should
be resolved in favor of doing so. See Russell at 1193, and Katz at 93.
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3.

In the present case the court held that this was not in fact a debt action as claimed

by the appellee but was instead a tort action and that actions based on tort could not be
assigned (see attached exhibit A). With regards to the discretion of the court to rule on 60(b)
type actions the court in Workman v. Nagle Const. Inc.. 802 P2d at 752 (Utah App 1990)
held that even though generally the court has some discretion in ruling on a rule 60(b)
motion, it does not have discretion if the judgment is determined to be void, and the judgment
must be set aside, see Workman, at 754.
4.

The issue becomes one of whether or not the judgment rendered by the court was

in fact an abuse of discretion if in fact the judgment itself was void. If actions based on tort
cannot be assigned then the action could not have been brought by the appellee in the first
place and every judgment which followed would suffer the same defect. The 60(b) motion
had to made under the circumstance of this case.
5. The Supreme Court of the state of Utah has suggested that in such cases where for
some reason the period for appeal has passed then it is appropriate to proceed under Rule
60(b) Utah R.Civ.P. that even in situations where a motion for new trial under Rule 59(a)
would fail due to the passage of time, a 60(b) motion would still be considered.
6. The Appellee's only defense is that the motion came too late. Due to the
appellant's move he did not receive notice for over a year and did not know what the
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appellant was doing with regards to the judgment The moving party need only show that he
acted diligently once the basis for relief became available and that delay in seeking relief did
not cause undue hardship to the opposing party J Fnednthal M Kane and A Miller, Civil
Procedure Section 12 6 at 574 (1985)

POINT II
WHETHER THERE IS A MISTAKE OF LAW WHEN
A TORT IS TREATED AS A DEBT AND SUCH MISTAKE
SATISFIES THE EQUITY REQUIREMENT OF RULE 60b

1 "Mistake of law" has been defined as a mistaken opinion or inference arising from
an imperfect or incorrect exercise of the judgment upon the facts as they really are Heiser v
Florida Mortg . Title and Bonding Co . 105 Fla 657, 142 So 242, Deseret Nat Bank v
Dinwoodey, 17 Utah 43, 53 P 215 Such a mistake has been said to occur where a party,
having knowledge of the facts, is ignorant of the legal consequences of his conduct, Baratti
v Barattu 109 Cal App 2d 917, 242 P2d 22, or reaches an erroneous conclusion as to the
effect thereof, see Heiser, supra
2

However ignorance of the law is not the same s a mistake of law, Gilo v

Campbell. 114 Cal App 2d Supp 853, 250 P2d 373 It has been said that the difference lies
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in the proof of one over the other and yet the end results are the same. The rule therefore in
equity, where relief is asked against a mistake or ignorance of law, is that there is no
distinction between the two, Goodspeed v. Ithaca Street R. Co.. 184 NY 351, 77 NE 392.
3. The mistake which has taken place in this case is like unto the discussion above
inasmuch as part of the injustice of the case and the potential for abuse of others similarly
situated is to cause and inequitable result due to the lesser talents of the unsuspecting and
frightened defendants in such cases, but it also distinguishable in part. The mistake here is
also the mistake which comes as a result of all the parties or at least those with legal
expertise, supposed that they knew and understood the law but in fact misapprehend it,
Vickerson v. Frev. 100 Cal App 2d 621, 224 P2d 126.
4. Under Rule 17 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure subparagraph (a) it so states
that every action must be brought by the "real party in interest".
5. Under Utah Code 54-8a-l through 8 or Chapter 8a entitled "Damage to
Underground Utility Facilities" the state legislature of the State of Utah has provided the
Statutorial guidelines for treatment of incidents such as the one presented in this case.
Another mistake of law is where in the presence of a statutorily proscribed remedy another is
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used in its place, See 54 Am Jur 2d Section 8, at pp. 454 , 455 et seq. primarily for the
benefit of the one seeking to enforce his position.
6. So long as there are no adequate remedies at law, see 27 Am Jur 2d, Equity,
Section 86, equity will relieve against the consequences of mistake of fact.

POINT III:
WHETHER APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO HAVE THE
PRIOR JUDGMENT SET ASIDE DUE TO THE FACT THAT
A JUDGMENT WHICH IS VOID
CANNOT BE LEGITIMIZED PROCEDURALLY
1.

A judgment, in order to serve as the maintenance of an action thereon, must be

valid, Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Min. & Smelting Co.. 225 US 111, 32 S Ct 641,
and not void, Biddle v. Wilkins (US) 1 Pet 686, 7 L Ed 315.
2. What makes this case particularly unsettlingly is that if it were allowed to stand
and set the precedence that even if the material aspects of the case taken for face value, i.e.
that torts and debts are not the same and a cause of action for a tort cannot be assigned, the
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mixture of aspects of the law which are otherwise not compatible can now be overlooked in
favor of procedural superiority.
3. A judgment which is voidable merely is not a nullity, Tari v. State, 117 Ohio St
481, 159 NE 594; Commonwealth v. Macklev , 380 Pa 70, 110 A2d 172.

Until superceded,

reversed, or vacated it is still good law, Gunn v. Plant, 94 US 664, is binding everywhere,
see 46 Am Jur 2d Section 48.
4. However a void judgment is not entitled to the respect accorded to, Chivers v.
Johnston County, 62 Okla 2, 161 P 822, and is attended by none of the consequences of, a
valid adjudication, see Chivers, supra at 2. Indeed a void judgment need not be recognized
by anyone, Aramovich v. Doles, 244 Ind 658, 195 NE2d 481, but may be entirely
disregarded, Martin v. Soden, 81 Idaho 274, 340 p2d 848, or declared inoperative in which
effect is sought to be given to it. See Re Christiansen, 17 Utah 412, 53 P 1003, later app 23
Utah 209, 63 P 896.
5. It has no legal or binding force or efficacy for any purpose or at any place,
Hollingsworth v. Barbour (US) 4 Pet 466, 7 L Ed 922. It cannot affect, impair, or create
rights, Pennoyer v Neff, 95 US 714, see also Re Christiansen, supra., nor can any rights be
based thereon. See Prather v Lovd, 86 Idaho 45, 382 P2d 910.
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6. Although it is not necessary to take any steps to have a void judgment reversed or
vacated, see 46 Am Jur 2d Section 49 at 348, it is open to attack or impeachment in any
proceeding, see Martin, supra. , direct or collateral, and at any time.
7. The general rule is that a judgment which is void cannot be cured by subsequent
proceedings, Langston v. Nash. 192 Ga 427, 15 SE2d 481; Holder v. Scott (Tex Civ App)
396 SW2d 906.
8. Such a judgment cannot be validated by citing the parties against whom it is
rendered with an order to show cause why it should not be held to be valid, Jewett v Iowa
Land Co.. 64 Minn 531, 67 NW 639., nor can it even be made legal by ratification of the
legislature which is viod for want of jurisdiction.
9. The judgment obtained by CM A is void because CM A was not a property to the
law suit, lacked standing to bring tlie action, and sought to seek relief in negligence while
classifying the action as a debt collection.

CONCLUSION

In the present case the court did not detect the misuse of the debt collection proceed
although it later acknowedged that such a procedure could not happen. Opposing counsel a
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duly licensed attorney apparently did not see the apparent contradiction in using a collection
action in place of a tort action. The ramifications of such a precedent are clear. The line
between debt collection and tort action will disappear. What would normally have been taken
care of in the less formal atmosphere of small claims court is required to go into the formal
rigidity of the higher court due to the assignment.
The Circuit court denied Appellant's motion because the argument was not made "at
trial or by a motion earlier than trial time" see exhibit A. The time at which the motion was
made did not detract from the fact that the judgment was in fact void. A debt assignee
cannot bring an action founded on the tortious conduct of another when it is not reasonable.
Under Subsection (5), a judgment which is void does not fall under the constraints of the
other sections or the 3 month requirement. It is the position of the appellant that is a very
good reason why the law is read so. Rule 60(b) was intended as a "safety" valve against
abuses of discretions or cases that were simply founded on a poor interpretation of the law.
In this case is to the detriment of the appellant. To permit this case to stand will be to open
the floodgates of illegal and improper litigation and the assignment of tort actions as debt
collection. The judgment was void and Rule 60 (b) applies.

DATED: 12-3-93

P#fl J.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I, Paul J. Young, on this 3rd day of December , 1993, did cause to be mailed first class
United States mail, postage prepaided, a TWO copies of the foregoing document to the parties
listed below:

Ralph C. Amott
Attorney at Law
60 East 100 South, Suite 102
Provo, Utah 84601
And Eight Copies plus one original to the Utah Court of Appeals

jfourtfj Circuit Court
Judge E. Patrick McGuire

COLLECTION MANAGEMENT AGENCY , INC.
VS.
JAY MORTENSEN
June 11, 1993
CIVIL # 903002720cv

THIS MATTER IS BEFORE THE COURT ON A MOTION BY DEFENDANT TO
SET ASIDE JUDMENT, ACCOMPANIED BY MEMORANDUM WITH A FACTUAL
REVIEW AND POINTS AND AUTHORITIES. PLAINTIFF HAS SUBMITTED A
COUNTER MEMORANDUM.
THE ISSUE, SIMPLY STATED IS WHETHER OR NOT THE THE TERM "OR
OTHER INDEBTEDNESS" FOUND IN U.C.A. 12-1-8 INCLUDES "DEBTS" OCCURED
BY A CLAIMED NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE DEFENDANT. A "DEBT"
SUIT BASED ON TORT, AND NOT CONTRACT.
AS STATED BY COUNSEL THERE APPARENTLY IS NO CASE LAW ON THE
SUBJECT MATTER, THEREFORE WE ARE LEFT TO OUR OWN
INTERPRETATIONS.
IT IS THE COURTS OPINION THAT THE TERM OR OTHER INDEBTEDNESS
DOES NOT CONTEMPLATE ASSIGNED ACTIONS BASED ON TORT. THE FLIES
INTO THE FACE OF THE WHOLE CONCEPT OF COLLECTION AGENCIES AND
THE CONCEPT OF ASSIGNMENT.
HOWEVER, IN THIS CASE THE MATTER SHOULD HAVE BEEN RAIDED AT
TRIAL OR BY OF A MOTION EARLIER THAN THE TRIAL TIME. DEFENDANTS
MOTION IS NOT TIMELY.
MOTION DENIED. THE DECISION STANDS.
BY ORpER QP-THE COURT^

^

JUDGE E. PATRICK MeGUIRE
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

125 North 100 West / Provo, Utah 84601

